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Rational Feelings*
Alix Cohen
While it is well known that Kant’s transcendental idealism forbids the
transcendent use of reason and its ideas, what had been underexplored until
the last decade or so is his account of the positive use of reason’s ideas as it is
expounded in the appendix of the Critique of Pure Reason. The main
diﬃculty faced by his account is that, while there is no doubt that for Kant
we need to rely on the ideas of reason in order to gain knowledge of the
empirical world, the justiﬁcatory grounds for our use remain unclear.
Commentators have suggested various ways of addressing this worry. Some
emphasize that reason’s demand for systematicity is purely methodological.
Others stress that the assumption that nature itself is systematically uniﬁed is
transcendentally necessary. Some simply deem Kant’s account “extremely
self-contradictory.” What is clear is that if neither the presupposition of
nature’s systematic unity nor the command to seek this unity have any
justiﬁcation, reason’s regulative function, which plays a crucial role in Kant’s
account of cognition, also lacks justiﬁcation. This would be a disastrous
result, for it would threaten the very possibility of cognition and its progress.
This chapter proposes to tackle this problem from a new angle by
exploring the role of reason’s feelings in Kant’s account. While the rela-
tionship between practical reason and feeling has been explored at length
in the literature, the relationship between theoretical reason and feeling has
not, and my aim is to suggest that doing so can shed new light on reason’s
* Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel
Kant: Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, .
 See “Transcendental Dialectic,” Critique of Pure Reason.
 For the ﬁrst, see for instance Paul Guyer, “Reason and Reﬂective Judgment: Kant on the Signiﬁcance
of Systematicity,” Noûs , no.  (): –. For the second, see for instance Michelle Grier,
Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), .
 NormanKemp Smith,ACommentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan,
), . See also Thomas E. Wartenberg, “Reason and the Practice of Science,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), .

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cognitive activity. For focusing on the fact that theoretical reason’s need
manifests itself as a feeling will enable me to reassess how this need is met
through reason’s regulative use of its ideas.
Following a summary in Section . of Kant’s account of the regulative
use of the ideas of reason, Section . turns to reason’s feelings. After
spelling out the function of feeling in the general economy of the mind,
I put forward an account of the genesis of theoretical reason’s feelings that
deﬁnes them as aﬀective manifestations of reason’s activity. To support the
claim that these feelings can play a legitimate role in cognition, Section .
argues that we should think of them on the model of the feeling of respect
for the moral law. They are both rational feelings in the sense that they are
eﬀects of reason on feeling – aﬀective manifestations of reason and its activity.
On this basis, Section . shows that the function of the feeling of reason’s
need allows us to vindicate the regulative use of the ideas of reason, although it
does so for the sole purpose of enabling our cognitive activity.
. The Cognitive Function of the Ideas of Reason
Although Kant deﬁnes reason’s ideas as concepts to which no correspond-
ing object can be given in experience, they nevertheless have a legitimate
role to play in it.
[I]n regard to the whole of possible experience, it is not the idea itself but
only its use that can be either extravagant (transcendent) or indigenous
(immanent), according to whether one directs them straightway to a
supposed object corresponding to them, or only to the use of the under-
standing in general regarding the objects with which it has to do. (A)
In its more general form, the positive function of reason is to project the
idea of systematic unity as the regulative principle of cognition: “what
reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about concerning it is
the systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one
principle” (A). By turning its ideas into heuristics, reason provides
orientation within the empirical world by commanding us “to seek out the
necessary and greatest possible unity of nature” (A). It enables the
progress of cognition by demanding that we structure and unify our
cognition of the world – Kant talks about “the systematic connection that
reason can give to the empirical use of the understanding” (A).
 While I cannot get into the details of these principles here, note that each corresponds to an idea of
reason. They consist in looking for homogeneity (by searching for “sameness of kind”), variety (by
“distinguish[ing] subspecies”) and continuity (by looking for the “aﬃnity of various branches”)
  
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Although the complete systematization of knowledge can never be realized,
reason can nevertheless be successful in enabling the concrete uniﬁcation
of certain laws, in particular by bringing heterogeneous laws of nature
under higher ones. For instance, “under the guidance of those principles
we come to a unity of genera in the forms of these paths [i.e., orbits of
planets], but thereby also further to unity in the cause of all the laws of this
motion (gravitation)” (A). The regulative use of the ideas of reason
thus plays a crucial role in Kant’s account of cognition, its condition of
possibility, and its progress.
Though the preceding claims have been much discussed in the litera-
ture, what is often left out is that the ground of reason’s demand for
systematicity is its need for it: “this guiding thread [i.e., the principle of
systematicity] is not an objective principle of reason, a principle of insight,
but a merely subjective one [i.e. a maxim] of the only use of reason allowed
by its limits – a corollary of its need” (OT ; emphasis added). While
reason cannot presuppose the objective reality of its ideas in the empirical
world, it can orient itself in the sensible world on their basis as long as this
orientation is based on its need. Yet how are we to make sense of the status
of this need? As Paul Guyer ﬁrst noted, adopting regulative principles
seems to amount to “merely postulating or presupposing that an object
will meet one’s needs, rather than obtaining evidence that it does.”
Thereby, we merely “transform our own need for systematicity into a
self-serving delusion that nature is systematic.” In other words, neither
the presupposition of nature’s unity nor the command to seek unity on
which it is based seem to have any justiﬁcation. If true, this would entail
that reason’s regulative function, which plays a crucial role in Kant’s
account of cognition, its condition of possibility, and its progress, also
lacks justiﬁcation.
(A). For illuminating discussions of how the regulative use of the ideas of reason furthers the
progress of cognition, see Frederick Rauscher, “The Appendix to the Dialectic and the Canon of
Pure Reason: The Positive Role of Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), –, and Nicholas
Rescher, Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’s Theory of Rational Systematization
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), esp. –.
 See also: “The second regulative idea of merely speculative reason is the concept of the world in
general. For nature is really the single given object in regard to which reason needs regulative
principles” (A; emphasis added). “[I]n relation to that which is given to the senses as existing,
we need the idea of a being which is necessary in itself, but can never have the least concept of this
being and its absolute necessity” (A; emphasis added).
 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ),
, .
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Commentators have suggested various ways of addressing this worry
with mixed degrees of success. What has not been explored, however, is
the role the feeling of reason’s need plays in Kant’s argument. While this
feeling does not appear in the ﬁrst Critique, it ﬁgures prominently in the
essay, “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” where Kant
talks about “reason’s feeling of its own need [Bedürfnis],” “a felt* need of
reason” [gefühltes Bedürfnis der Vernunft] (OT , ). The few com-
mentators who do discuss this feeling suggest that it should be interpreted
metaphorically. According to Pauline Kleingeld, for instance, the conative
terms in which Kant describes reason should be understood as cases of
“symbolic exhibition” so as to avoid “confounding [Kant’s] distinction
between reason and feeling.” Similarly for John Zammito, “Bedürfnis
must not be read too literally as itself a feeling or need.” These metaphor-
ical interpretations are largely based on the footnote that claims that
“[r]eason does not feel” (OT n). By contrast with these interpretations,
I will argue that they are rational feelings in the full nonmetaphorical sense
of the term. To support this claim, the following section will put forward
an account of the genesis of theoretical reason’s feelings that deﬁnes them
as aﬀective manifestations of reason’s activity.
. Theoretical Reason’s Feelings: The Pain of Reason’s
Need vs. the Pleasure of Systematization
The argument I defend here starts from a conception of feeling that
I began to develop in previous work. In this chapter I simply lay out
features of that view, without trying to defend them in any detail. As I see
it, making sense of the function of feeling in the general economy of the
 See the commentators mentioned in notes  and . As Hannah Ginsborg succinctly puts it, “Either
way, it might seem, to adopt the principle of judgment is to presuppose something factual about
nature, some objective feature in virtue of which it meets our cognitive needs. And, either way,
Guyer’s problem arises: what justiﬁcation do we have for presupposing a priori something whose
obtaining is discoverable – at least to some extent – by empirical enquiry?” (Ginsborg, “Why Must
We Presuppose the Systematicity of Nature?” in Kant and Laws, ed. Michela Massimi and Angela
Breitenbach [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming]).
 Pauline Kleingeld, “The Conative Character of Reason in Kant’s Philosophy,” Journal of the History
of Philosophy , no.  (): . She argues that “Kant’s talk of the needs, striving, and satisfaction
of reason . . . can be understood as based on an analogy . . . An organism () is to the object of its
needs (B) as reason (C) is to the regulative ideas or postulates (D)” (Kleingeld, “The Conative
Character of Reason in Kant’s Philosophy,” ).
 John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
), .
 See Cohen, “Kant on Emotions, Feelings and Aﬀectivity,” in The Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed.
Matthew C. Altman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).
  
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mind will enable me to determine the role of rational feelings in Kant’s
account of theoretical reason’s activity.
According to Kant, our mental powers are constituted by three faculties:
the faculty of cognition, which generates cognitions; the faculty of desire,
which generates volitions; and the faculty of feeling. Without getting into
the detail of Kant’s account, what is crucial for the purpose of my argument
is that each faculty gives rise to diﬀerent kinds of mental states and has a
distinct function in the general economy of the mind. While the faculty
of cognition is cognitive and the faculty of desire conative, Kant deﬁnes the
feelings of pleasure and pain in terms of the promotion and hindrance of
life: “Pleasure is the representation of the agreement of an object or of an action
with the subjective conditions of life” (CPR n). What this means in my view
is that the faculty of feeling enables the agent to track and evaluate his
mental activity and its conditions – its function is orientational. On this
basis, we can make sense of the painfulness of feelings of pain and the
pleasantness of feelings of pleasure in light of the fact that they manifest the
negative or positive eﬀects of a representation upon the subject and his
potential for activity. Anything that inhibits his potential for activity is
painful while everything that facilitates it is pleasurable. The function of
feeling is thus to make the subject aware of what promotes and what hinders
his activity: “Life is the inner principle of self-activity. . . . Only active beings
can have pleasure and displeasure. Subjects that are active according to
representations have pleasure and displeasure” (AK :–).
According to Kant, feelings can be oriented either toward objects or
toward the subject. This is due to the fact that each faculty of the mind has
a higher and lower subfaculty. Whereas the lower faculties passively receive
 These faculties are distinct in kind, so that contrary to common misconceptions, the faculty of
cognition does not include “all the faculties of the mind” . . . “We can trace all faculties of the
human mind without exception back to these three: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure
and displeasure, and the faculty of desire” (CJ ). For a comprehensive map of the diﬀerent
faculties, their subfaculties, and their interrelations, see Julian Wuerth, Kant on Mind, Action, and
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –.
 “To every faculty of the mind one can attribute an interest, that is, a principle that contains the
condition under which alone its exercise is promoted” (CPR ). For detailed discussions of Kant’s
account of the faculties and their functioning, see in particular Alfredo Ferrarin, The Powers of Pure
Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ),
–.
 Kant hints at this deﬁnition of feeling in the following passage: “Here the representation is related
entirely to the subject, indeed to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure, which grounds an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging that contributes
nothing to cognition but only holds the given representation in the subject up to the entire faculty
of representation, of which the mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state” (CJ ;
emphasis added).
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representations from objects, the higher faculties are themselves sources of
representations. In the case of the faculty of feeling, its higher faculty is
concerned with the subject, its lower faculty with objects.
The lower faculty of pleasure and displeasure is a power to ﬁnd satisfaction
or dissatisfaction in the objects which aﬀect us. The higher faculty of
pleasure and displeasure is a power to sense a pleasure and displeasure in
ourselves, independently of objects. (AK :–)
Insofar as lower feelings are object based, when a sensible feeling of
pleasure is triggered by the representation of an object, it gives rise to a
sensible desire: “inclination is thereby aroused” (CJ ). By contrast,
higher feelings are subject based in the sense that they manifest the state of
the subject’s mental agency. The feeling of reason’s need is one of these
higher feelings.
While Kant does not oﬀer an account of the genesis of the feeling of
reason’s need, his clearest statement asserts that “Reason does not feel; it
has insight into its lack and through the drive for cognition it eﬀects the
feeling of a need” (OT n). This suggests that the feeling of reason’s
need already presupposes cognitive activity. The gap between reason’s ideal
for cognition and the current state of cognition gives rise to a feeling of
need when it is combined with a drive to cognize.
To make sense of this claim, recall that, as spelled out in Section .,
while reason’s aim is the systematization of knowledge, it is incapable of
fully achieving its end. The world can never be fully cognized and thus our
knowledge of it can never be fully uniﬁed. The incompleteness of our
knowledge takes the form of an unbridgeable gap between reason’s ideal
for cognition as it is presented by the ideas of reason and cognition in its
current state. Although reason has a conception of what the complete
conditions of appearances should look like, it is unable to provide them.
The feeling of reason’s need is the eﬀect of the incompleteness of the
agent’s theoretical framework on feeling. In order, to avoid potential
misunderstandings, note that this feeling is not the eﬀect of the recogni-
tion or judgment of incompleteness, but rather the aﬀective manifestation
of reason’s incapacity to achieve the complete systematization of
knowledge.
Furthermore, as already noted, although the complete systematization
of knowledge can never be realized, reason can nevertheless be successful in
the concrete uniﬁcation of certain laws, in particular when it brings
 I would like to thank Yoon Choi for helping me clarify this point.
  
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heterogeneous laws of nature under higher ones. What is often overlooked,
however, is that this epistemic success gives rise to a feeling of pleasure.
[T]he discovered uniﬁability of two or more empirically heterogeneous laws
of nature under a principle that comprehends them both is the ground of a
very noticeable pleasure, often indeed of admiration, even of one which does
not cease though one is already suﬃciently familiar with its object. (CJ )
This pleasure manifests the achievement of a distinct kind of cognition,
systematized cognition, which alone fulﬁlls the end of reason. For as
Kant notes, “The interest of [reason’s] speculative use consists in the
cognition of the object up to the highest a priori principle” (CPR ).
When this interest is fulﬁlled and cognition is uniﬁed according to general
a priori principles, no matter how partially, it gives rise to what I would
like to call the pleasure of systematization. This feeling manifests the
eﬀective realization of the ideas of reason in the form of systematic
knowledge – although of course, this realization can only ever be partial.
In this sense, the activity of speculative reason is the cause of two
distinct feelings: a positive one, the pleasure of systematization, and a
negative one, the feeling of reason’s need. Crucially for my account, they
are intrinsically connected to each other, for there is a loop from the pain
of reason’s need to the pleasure of systematization. Insofar as the feeling of
reason’s need is a negatively valenced feeling, it triggers a desire to dispose
of it and thus of what has caused it, namely the gap between reason’s ideal
for cognition and its current state. This gap is thus ﬁlled by using the
 See also: “It thus requires study to make us attentive to the purposiveness of nature for our
understanding in our judging of it, where possible bringing heterogeneous laws of nature under
higher though always still empirical ones, so that if we succeed in this accord of such laws for our
faculty of cognition, which we regard as merely contingent, pleasure will be felt” (CJ –).
 This type of cognition corresponds to what Kant calls the act of “comprehension.” It consists in
making sense of something by means of the general principles and grounds that determine it as well
as other instances of the same kind, by contrast with “conception,” which consists in understanding
something by means of concepts: “to understand something (intelligere), i.e., to cognize something
through the understanding by means of concepts, or to conceive . . . to comprehend [begreifen] something
(comprehendere), i.e., to cognize something through reason or a priori to the degree that is suﬃcient
for our purpose” (AK :). See also AK : and :–. For an account of the distinction
between understanding and comprehension, see Angela Breitenbach, “Understanding, Knowledge,
and the Touchstone of Truth,” in Proceedings of the th International Kant Congress, ed. Violetta L.
Waibel and Margit Ruﬃng (Berlin: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
 As Kant writes, “Pleasure is a state of the mind in which a representation is in agreement with itself,
as a ground, either merely for preserving this state itself (for the state of the powers of the mind
reciprocally promoting each other in a representation preserves itself), or for producing its object”
(AK :–). Conversely for pain: “What directly (through sense) urges me to leave my state (to
go out of it) is disagreeable to me – it causes me pain” (APV ). For a discussion of the
motivational function of feeling in this context, see Rachel Zuckert, “A New Look at Kant’s
Theory of Pleasure,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , no.  (): –.
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ideas of reason as a regulative guide for cognition so as to further the
uniﬁcation of knowledge. When reason’s need is fulﬁlled through the
progress of the empirical systematization of cognition, it occasions a feeling
of pleasure – the pleasure of systematization. Thus the loop from the
pain of reason’s need to the pleasure of systematization eﬀects the ongoing
and never-ending progress of systematized cognition.
However, assigning a cognitive role to the feeling of reason’s need goes
against Kant’s account of cognition, which prohibits feelings from providing
any cognitive content, epistemic standard, cognitive ground, or epistemic
guidance. As he repeatedly claims, “pleasure and displeasure in general . . .
is something merely subjective, which yields no cognition” (MM ). Let
me brieﬂy spell out what this claim entails.
First, in feelings, “nothing at all in the object is designated” (CJ ),
for they “involve what is merely subjective in the relation of our representa-
tion and contain no relation at all to an object for possible cognition of it
(or even cognition of our condition)” (MM –). No knowledge can
be attained through them: they “can never produce a cognition”
(AK :). This is because they do not yield objective but merely
subjective certainty:
[F]requently we take something to be certain merely because it pleases us,
and we take something to be uncertain merely because it displeases or
annoys us. This certainty or uncertainty is not objective, however, but
instead subjective. (AK :)
Second, feelings cannot be used to justify or validate beliefs in any way.
Epistemic justiﬁcation is only a matter of evidence, judgment, and logical
inference, and aﬀective states are thus irrelevant.
Someone can be aesthetically certain if he holds the opposite of a thing or
cognition that he has to be impossible merely because it does not please
him. Thus, e.g., if his cognition is to believe in a divine being, eternal
government, a future world, reward for good actions, punishment for bad
 My account of the genesis of the feeling of reason’s need can be used to address a potential objection
raised by Kleingeld. She notes that “nowhere does Kant discuss the anthropological structures that
would account for the genesis of the feeling of the ‘need of reason’ in a manner parallel to this
discussion of the feeling of respect” (Kleingeld, “The Conative Character of Reason in Kant’s
Philosophy,” –). Yet I have shown that Kant’s remarks in “What Does It Mean to Orient
Oneself in Thinking?” can be interpreted so as to provide such an account.
 See also: “Through sensation, good feeling, pain – one does not cognize an object” (AK :);
and “Feelings can never produce a cognition” (AK :). As Sherman notes, “Kant’s own oﬃcial
theory of the emotions leaves out the conceptual connection of emotion with cognition” (Nancy
Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ], ).
  
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ones, etc. Certainty here rests merely on feeling[;] as something gives
someone pleasure or displeasure, so accordingly does he accept it or reject
it. In this way the human mind is actually subjected to very many illusions
and deceptions. (AK :)
When we use feelings in such ways, they produce illusions, unwarranted
beliefs, and false cognitions; they give rise to illegitimate epistemic proced-
ures: wishful thinking, unreliable grounds, warped standards, bias, and
partiality. They introduce a subjective dimension into what should be wholly
objective. For instance, if a belief that is unjustiﬁed gives me pleasure and
induces me to accept it as true, or if I take a mere hypothesis to be true on
the basis that it comes together with a feeling of certainty, I bring non-
epistemic concerns to bear onto epistemic ones, thereby leading to unjusti-
ﬁed beliefs. Thus feelings should not be used to provide any cognitive
content, epistemic standard, cognitive ground, or epistemic guidance.
If this claim is correct, the justiﬁcation of the regulative use of the ideas of
reason now seems even more problematic than Guyer originally thought.
For if it operates through what is in eﬀect an aﬀective feedback loop from
the pain of reason’s need to the pleasure of systematization, it seems to give
rise to a vicious circle that turns cognition into a futile exercise of “self-
serving delusion.” However, I will argue that it does not, since Kant’s
rejection of the cognitive role of feeling only applies to sensible feelings. The
feeling of reason’s need, by contrast, is a rational feeling, and as such, it can
play a legitimate role in cognition. To support this claim, I will show that,
although Kant does not say much about the feeling of reason’s need, it
should be thought of as belonging to a distinctive category of feeling,
rational feeling, modelled on the feeling of respect for the moral law.
. Reason’s Feelings: The Feeling of Need vs.
the Feeling of Respect
There is a vast literature on Kant’s account of the feeling of respect, and
I cannot even begin to make a dent in it here. However, what is crucial
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, .
 The literature on the feeling of respect for the law is usually divided into two camps: aﬀectivists who
argue that the feeling of respect is necessary for dutiful action, and intellectualists who acknowledge
it is present, but argue all motivational work is on the part of reason. For the former, see for instance
Richard McCarty, “Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect,” Journal of the History of
Philosophy , no.  (): –. For the latter, see Andrews Reath, “Kant’s Theory of Moral
Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Inﬂuence of Inclination,” Kant-Studien  ():
–. What these interpretations have in common is that they fail to appreciate that the feeling
of respect belongs to the distinctive category of “rational feeling.” As such, on my reading, it
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for my present purpose is to note that what makes respect for the moral
law a feeling is the following:
() It “is an eﬀect on feeling.” (CPR )
() It is a “subjective ground of activity.” (CPR )
() It is “the subjective determining ground of the will” (CPR ) – an
incentive (Triebfeder).
Yet Kant also points out that the feeling of respect is of “a peculiar kind”
(CPR ):
(R) It is a feeling that “is not of empirical origin.” (CPR )
(R) It is a subjective ground of activity that is “produced solely by
reason.” (CPR )
(R) It is an incentive that “can be cognized a priori.” (CPR )
The features that set respect apart from other feelings are meant to avoid a
contradiction between, on the one hand, Kant’s rejection of heteronomous
forms of motivation based on sensible feelings and, on the other, his need
to account for an incentive that impels us to act for the sake of the moral
law. For, by contrast with the feeling of respect, other feelings have the
following features:
(S) They are eﬀects on feelings that are “received by means of inﬂu-
ence.” (G n)
(S) They are subjective grounds of activity that are “sensible” and
“pathologically eﬀected.” (CPR )
(S) They are subjective determining grounds of the will that “always
belong to the order of nature” (MM ) – inclinations (Neigungen).
Notwithstanding their fundamental diﬀerences, the feeling of respect and
sensible feelings have a feature in common, which Kant repeatedly empha-
sizes. Namely, both the feeling of respect and sensible feelings generate a
“drive”; they have a conative dimension.
[R]espect as consciousness of direct necessitation of the will by the law is
hardly an analogue of the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the
faculty of desire it does the same thing but from diﬀerent sources. (CPR ;
emphasis added)
functions neither as an inclination, as aﬀectivists believe, nor as a cognition, as intellectualists
believe; rather, it has the unique features of a rational feeling insofar as it manifests the conditions of
moral agency.
 See also: respect “is something that is regarded as an object neither of inclination nor fear, though it
has something analogous to both” (G n).
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While this analogy emphasizes what the feeling of respect shares with sensible
feelings (i.e., its motivational aspect), Kant also draws another analogy, an
analogy between theoretical reason’s feeling of its need and moral feeling.
[Theoretical reason] does not feel . . . it eﬀects the feeling of a need. It is the
same way with moral feeling, which does not cause any moral law, for this
arises wholly for reason; rather, it is caused or eﬀected by moral laws, hence
by reason, because the active yet free will needs determinate grounds.
(OT n)
What this analogy suggests is that theoretical reason’s feeling of its need
and moral feeling share three features that set them apart from all other
feelings:
A. They are both called “feeling” in a sense that needs to be qualiﬁed.
a. For theoretical reason’s feeling, “[r]eason does not feel,” and yet
there is “a felt need of reason.” (OT )
b. Practical reason’s feeling is a “singular feeling which cannot be
compared to any pathological feeling.” (CPR )
B. They are both caused by reason alone.
a. Theoretical reason’s feeling “arises wholly from reason.”
(OT n)
b. Practical reason’s feeling is “produced solely by reason.”
(CPR )
C. They both supply grounds for rational activity.
a. Theoretical reason’s feeling provides “a subjective ground for . . .
orienting itself in thinking.” (OT )
b. Practical reason’s feeling is a “subjective ground of activity.”
(CPR )
The analogy between the feeling of reason’s need and moral feeling is not
only apt but remarkably enlightening. For in both cases the notion of
feeling has been qualiﬁed so that the features that make them feelings are
preserved while those that make them sensible are replaced with rational
features. Unlike ordinary sensible feelings, the feeling of reason’s need and
the feeling of respect do not have a sensible cause. As Kant notes repeatedly
concerning the feeling of respect, what distinguishes it from all feelings
“received by means of inﬂuence” is that it is “a feeling self-wrought”
(G n). While “every inﬂuence on feeling and every feeling in general”
is “pathological,” the feeling of respect is “practically eﬀected” rather than
“sensibly eﬀected”: “the incentive of the moral disposition must be free
from any sensible condition . . . on account of its origin, [respect] cannot
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be called pathologically eﬀected” (CPR ). It is because the feeling of
reason’s need and the feeling of respect “ﬁnd their source in reason itself”
that they are “speciﬁcally diﬀerent from all feelings of the ﬁrst kind”
(G n). They are what we could call ‘autonomous feelings,’ in reference
to Kant’s distinction between the autonomous form of motivation, in
which the will determines itself through the moral law, and heteronomous
forms of motivation, in which the will is determined by sensible feelings
and natural impulses. They are autonomously generated as well as
rationally determined since they are only conditioned by the agent’s own
rational capacities rather than external conditions over which he has little
or no control. It is in this sense that they are feelings like no others –
rational feelings, caused by reason and thus independent from any
sensible cause.
There is thus a crucial diﬀerence between reason being motivated
by nonrational, sensible feelings, and it being motivated by rational
feelings.
[W]e could not allege a need of reason if we had not before our eyes a
problematic but yet unavoidable concept of reason [i.e., an idea of
reason] . . . Without such prior necessary problems there are no needs, at
least not of pure reason; the rest are needs of inclination. (CPR )
Only sensible feelings fall prey to Kant’s claim that feelings are not capable
of providing epistemic guidance. By contrast, we can legitimately use the
ideas of reason regulatively on the basis of theoretical reason’s feeling
insofar as it is a rational feeling. As a rational feeling, the feeling of
reason’s need can be used as a ground for our cognitive activity. Insofar as
it originates in reason, it is rationally determined and provides us with a
legitimate guide to a cognitive task – an aﬀective response that can play a
justiﬁcatory role, by contrast with other kinds of aﬀective responses (e.g.,
wishful thinking, discussed in Section .).
To make sense of the nature of the cognitive function that is thereby
vindicated, however, we need to focus on its role as a rational feeling. As
the following section will show, by applying my account of feeling to the
 See G .
 For a clear and detailed account of the nature of inclinations in Kant’s psychology, see Patrick R.
Frierson, Kant’s Empirical Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), esp. chap. .
 As Willaschek notes, “even the interest of speculative reason is practical in so far as it is based on a
need of reason and also in so far as it directs us to do something (namely to inquire into a priori
principles)” (Marcus Willaschek, “The Primacy of Practical Reason and the Idea of a Practical
Postulate,” in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide, ed. Andrews Reath and Jens
Timmermann [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ], ).
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case of theoretical reason’s feelings, we can determine their function vis-à-
vis reason’s activity and thereby vindicate reason’s regulative use of its
ideas. Yet crucially, this vindication is restricted to the sole purpose of
enabling cognitive activity.
. The Vindication of the Regulative Use of the
Ideas of Reason
On my reading, when we rely on theoretical reason’s feelings, we act, to
borrow Kant’s idiom, for reason’s sake, to promote rational agency and
its conditions. And in this respect, we do so legitimately. To make sense
of this claim, recall that, as spelled out in section , without reason’s
demand for unity through its ideas, the activity of the understanding
would have no guidance: “the law of reason to seek unity is necessary,
since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent
use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no suﬃcient mark of
empirical truth” (A). The regulative use of the ideas of reason
makes it possible for reason to guide the understanding in the ongoing
production of systematic knowledge: reason “gives a principle for the
progression according to empirical laws, through which the investigation
of nature becomes possible” (AK :–). Reason’s feelings, qua
feelings, contribute to this ongoing progress by manifesting the condi-
tions of rational agency – a feeling of pleasure when its conditions are
fulﬁlled and rational agency is furthered, and a feeling of pain when its
conditions are unfulﬁlled and rational agency is hindered.
[H]ence we are also delighted (strictly speaking, relieved of a need) when we
encounter such a systematic unity among merely empirical laws, just as if it
were a happy accident which happened to favor our aim, even though we
necessarily had to assume that there is such a unity, yet without having been
able to gain insight into it and to prove it. (CJ )
 For a similar claim that without the assumption of systematicity the use of the understanding and
thus the possibility of experience itself will be undermined, see A–. For a discussion of this
claim, see Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, –. Although I cannot defend this part of the
claim here, I would argue that theoretical reason ought to rely on its feelings. Otherwise, it can
never progress and realize its ends, as Kant suggests when he writes that “the most common
experience would not be possible without it” (CJ ).
 Kant notes that “Conversely, a representation of nature that foretold that even in the most minor
investigation of the most common experience we would stumble on a heterogeneity in its laws that
would make the uniﬁcation of its particular laws under universal empirical ones impossible for our
understanding would thoroughly displease us; because this would contradict the principle of the
subjective-purposive speciﬁcation of nature in its genera” (CJ –). This feeling of displeasure
should be interpreted as the aﬀective eﬀect of our cognitive failure to systematize our cognitions.
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Yet crucially for my account, it is not because the regulative use of reason’s
ideas gives rise to successful systematization that it is justiﬁed.
Of course, our ideas as regulative guides do work, and we do feel
pleasure from their success. There is thus a sense in which the ongoing
empirical realization of the ideas of reason through the uniﬁcation and
systematization of our knowledge of the natural world serves as a retro-
active and ongoing conﬁrmation that we were not in the wrong in relying
on them. Or to put it slightly diﬀerently, if they did not work, we would
know it. If cognition was not progressing by doing so, it would not make
sense for reason to carry on using its ideas regulatively. Yet it is merely an
empirical and incomplete conﬁrmation. The fact that the regulative use of
the ideas of reason occasions actual systematized cognition only provides
us with grounds for thinking that this use is not obviously illegitimate, but
it is not suﬃcient to justify the regulative use of reason’s ideas.
On my reading, the justiﬁcation of the regulative use of the ideas of
reason is grounded on the function of rational feelings. Insofar as they
manifest the conditions of rational agency and motivate us to act accord-
ingly, what they justify is the use reason makes of its ideas in order to
enable cognitive activity. In this respect, a crucial diﬀerence between
theoretical and practical reason is that, in the case of the latter, the feeling
of its need justiﬁes the belief in the existence of the object of its ideas
whereas, in the former, it only justiﬁes our regulative use of the ideas
themselves: “the principle that determines our judgment about it, though
it is subjective as a need, is yet, as the means of promoting what is objectively
(practically) necessary, the ground of a maxim of assent for moral purposes,
that is, a pure practical rational belief ” (CPR ). The ultimate justiﬁca-
tion of our reliance on the ideas of reason is practical, which conﬁrms the
fact that it is essentially connected to the needs of rational activity. While
this broader claim falls beyond the limits of this chapter, let me make sense
of the narrower claim about the justiﬁcation of the use theoretical reason
makes of its ideas by considering what goes on when relying on the feeling of
reason’s need is not justiﬁed, what Kant calls the transcendent use of reason.
In this case, reason’s feeling of its need pushes reason beyond the
legitimate bounds of experience.
[H]uman reason, without being moved merely by the idle desire for extent
and variety of knowledge, proceeds impetuously, driven on by an inward
 As Kant writes, “one is thereby neither prescribing a law to nature nor learning one from it by
means of observation (although that principle can be conﬁrmed by the latter)” (CJ ;
emphasis added).
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need, to questions such as cannot be answered by any empirical employ-
ment of reason, or by principles thence derived. (B)
Thereby, reason produces dialectical inferences whose conclusion illegit-
imately asserts the objective reality of the ideas of reason. When reason
addresses its needs by making a transcendent use of its ideas, its mistake is
to think that its feelings can contribute to cognition by the mere fact of
assigning objective reality to the content of its ideas. The transcendent use
of reason is really just reason’s wishful thinking for its ideas to generate
their own content. By contrast, recall that when reason uses its ideas
merely regulatively, their function is not (or at least not directly) to
generate content but merely to enable cognitive activity: “reason really
has as object only the understanding and its purposive application”
(A). Reason is thus only indirectly conducive to cognition. As Kant
repeatedly notes, the purpose of reason’s demand for unity is “for the
provision of our understanding,” “to bring the understanding into thor-
oughgoing connection with itself” (A). It is in this sense that reason’s
ideas are the condition of possibility of cognitive activity. Owing to
reason’s guidance, the understanding can get on with its activity, which
does give rise to knowledge. However, it is the regulative use of the ideas of
reason rather than their objective validity (i.e., the fact that they are true of
nature itself) that is necessary for the cognitive activity of the understanding.
As a result, to go back to Guyer’s original worry, the regulative use of
reason’s ideas is in some sense “self-serving” insofar as it serves theoretical
reason’s purpose. However, it is certainly not “a delusion” since it does not
entail any belief that nature is systematic. As I have argued, by relying on
reason’s regulative function on the basis of the feeling of reason’s need,
what we are committed to is neither the presupposition of nature’s
systematic unity nor the duty to seek this unity; rather, we are committed
to the activity of cognizing, and ultimately, to rational agency and the
improvement of its condition. On my reading, this commitment alone is
justiﬁed, which is all that cognition needs to keep going.
 Cf. also our “inextinguishable desire to ﬁnd ﬁrm footing somewhere beyond the limits of
experience. Reason has a presentiment of objects which possess a great interest for it” (A).
 To formulate this claim slightly diﬀerently, although there is no space to defend it here, the
regulative use of the ideas of reason is transcendentally necessary in the sense that it is the
condition of possibility of theoretical rational agency. In a similar vein, Sasha Mudd talks about
the “transcendental conditions on how we know” rather than “what we know”: “It conditions our
cognitive activity without directly conditioning the objects we grasp through our activity” (Mudd,
“Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in Kant,” European Journal of Philosophy , no. 
[]: ).
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, .
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. Conclusion
This chapter set out to shed new light on the notion of reason’s need by
emphasizing the fact that this need manifests itself as a feeling. As I have
argued, the function of the feeling of reason’s need allows us to vindicate
our reliance on the regulative use of the ideas of reason, although it does so
for the sole purpose of enabling our cognitive activity. Of course, a lot
more work needs to be done to oﬀer a complete picture of theoretical
reason’s activity in relation to its ideas. However, what I hope to have
shown is that focusing on rational feelings suggests a new way in Kant’s
account of rational agency and its conditions. Insofar as we can only
express our commitment to reason through its activity (theoretically
through the attempt to systematize knowledge according to the regulative
ideas of reason, and practically through universalizable willing for the sake
of the moral law), rational feelings enable us to cognize and will as we
ought to. Recall the analogy Kant draws between the feeling of reason’s
need and moral feeling: just as the feeling of respect plays the role of
determining ground for the will, the feeling of reason’s need provides a
determining ground for our regulative use of the ideas of reason. In this
sense, rational feelings reﬂect the transcendental conditions of agency: they
are concerned with the subject as transcendental a priori legislator of
nature and freedom.
 OT .
 For helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter, I would like to thank Yoon Choi and Diane
Williamson.
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